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ABSTRACT
This is the second (Paper II) in a mini series of three papers that summarise the final results from an evaluation study which DLR
GfR and its partners conducted on behalf of ESA. The objective of this study was to generate a roadmap for the implementation of
a European Space Traffic Management (STM) system within the next two decades under consideration of an evolving Air Traffic
Management (ATM) system. In Paper I (Tüllmann et al. 2017a) we demonstrated that collision risks do not prevent suborbital space
flights from the very beginning. We provided proof of concept that this kind of travel is generally possible, provided significant
advances in heat and collision shielding technologies can be achieved. Potential technical, conceptual and organisational setups in
response to Europe’s STM needs were discussed, focussing on technology and infrastructure development, Space Debris, Space
Surveillance & Tracking, Space Weather Monitoring and ATM and STM integration. The initial roadmap was presented showing
that the European STM system could become operational in the 2030 – 2035 time frame. Finally, the Top 10 STM-related issues were
identified that need to be solved on EU and UN level. In Paper II, we now cover the relevant Safety & Reliability (S&R) aspects which
should be reflected in a STM concept of operations. In this context relevant contributors to unsafe operations and hazardous events
as well as the parties at risk are identified. Safety Management Systems in aviation business are investigated in order to check to
what extent their S&R concepts and good-practices are applicable to STM operations. An initial Risk Classification Scheme for STM
purposes is presented and has been applied to classify the Space Weather risks identified in Paper I. Initial values for the acceptable
levels of safety for spaceplane occupants and for third parties at risk are presented and the hazards originating from re-entering
objects and airspace sharing are discussed. Paper II finishes with the outline of the envisaged Space Navigation Service Provider
(SNSP) certification process. This mini series of papers is concluded by Paper III (Tüllmann et al. 2017c) in which we provide initial
system and S&R requirements, constraints and recommendations that should be considered for a European STM setup.
Key words. Space Traffic Management – Air Traffic Management – suborbital point-to-point flights – Space Weather Monitoring –
Space Surveillance and Tracking – Space Debris & collision risks – Safety & Reliability – risk classification – certification
1. Introduction
The overall purpose of this paper (Paper II) is to present a high-
level strategy for a Safety and Reliability (S&R) concept reflect-
ing all relevant operational aspects of a European Space Traffic
Management (STM) system (see Paper I (Tüllmann et al. 2017a)
for a general introduction into STM, its definition and discussion
of needed infrastructure, concepts and services). In order to do
this, the first part of this paper (Chapter 1) describes fundamen-
tal terms and definitions, outlines the scope & boundary of such
a concept, identifies relevant interfaces, existing organisations &
STM-related activities and evaluates to what extent S&R knowl-
edge and good-practices are transferable from the aviation to the
STM sector.
Based on the results of this analysis, the second part of this
work (Chapter 2) covers recommended S&R objectives (includ-
ing regulations and standards, the overall S&R approach, a safety
Risk Classification Scheme (RCS), critical qualitative S&R re-
quirements, initial quantifications of acceptable levels of safety
(ALoS), the identifcation of key hazards and occurrence report-
ing) and an outline for a proposed Space Navigation Service
Provider certification process.
1.1. Terms and Definitions
It is not uncommon to find the same S&R terms with slightly dif-
ferent definitions within the suite of regulations, standards and
guidelines related to both the space and aviation industry. Exam-
ples include ICAO Annex 19 Safety Management, ECSS system
Glossary of terms, EU ANS regulation 1035/2011, EASA CS-
Definitions and RCC standard 321-16. However, it is important
to agree and publish a single set of terms and definitions related
to STM (including S&R) in order to help prevent misunderstand-
ings in future S&R work. Ideally, this would re-use and update
existing publications.
In the following, a fundamental set of terms used through-
out this work is defined in alphabetical order to help understand
the context of the high-level discussions in the remainder of this
paper:
1 of 13
R. Tüllmann et al.: On the Implementation of a European Space Traffic Management System – II. The Safety and Reliability Strategy
• ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practical): The balance of
risk mitigation factors, such as safety, time, cost and diffi-
culty of implementing the means of mitigation
• Consequence: A potential result of a Hazard
• Hazard: Any condition, event or circumstance which could
induce an undesired consequence
• Reliability: The probability of successful performance of a
system over a period of time
• Risk: The probability of the occurrence of a consequence,
together with its severity
• Safety: The state in which risks do not exceed an ALoS
• Severity: The extent of harm or damage that could reason-
ably occur during a consequence
• System: Any combination of equipment (hardware (HW)
and software (SW)), procedures, human resources or organ-
isations that perform a function.
Further definitions are also included in the proposed risk classi-
fication scheme presented in Sect. 2.3.
1.2. Scope and Boundary
It should be recognised that safety is not aimed at achieving zero
accidents, zero hazards or zero errors. The real target is to pro-
vide mitigating actions to prevent undesirable situations escalat-
ing. There is a lot of common ground between safety and relia-
bility methods, as well as shared foundations. A safe functional
system is more likely, if it is also reliable. There are numerous
topics related to the scope of the STM S&R strategy, which can
be broken down as below:
• Scenarios and operations
• Parties at risk
• Severity of risk
• Contributors
• Timing of risk management activities.
More details on these topics are given in the following sub-
sections.
1.2.1. Scenarios and Operations
In the context of this study and further to the definition given in
Paper I (Tüllmann et al. 2017a), the understanding of STM for
S&R risk consideration is mainly related to Traffic Management
of Suborbital Space Vehicles (SSVs) or spaceplanes1 in airspace
and space as well as to space objects re-entering airspace in a
controlled and uncontrolled way. The S&R scope applies to a
system and according to the definition of a system, this includes
any combination of equipment (HW & SW), procedures as well
as the supporting human resources and organisations. Best prac-
tices and experience related to safety indicate that the scope of
S&R work cannot be too broad.
1.2.2. Parties at risk
The top-level goal of the safety strategy is to minimise injuries
and, worst-case, fatalities to people, to an ALARP-level. It is as-
sumed that, at least initially, SSV/spaceplane passengers will not
1 We assume that the only difference between SSVs and spaceplanes is
that the former are used for simple vertical ballistic flights up to altitudes
of ∼100 km (e.g., for space joyriders) and that the latter are deployed on
complex suborbital ballistic point-to-point (p2p) flights (e.g., for pas-
senger or cargo transportation (cf. Paper I, Tüllmann et al. 2017a).
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Figure 1: Contributing groups to unsafe events.
be considered ’general public’, rather they will be well-informed
individuals with a status similar to crew members. This is impor-
tant for S&R, because a relatively high level of risk will need to
be accepted until the industry matures and higher levels of relia-
bility become practical.
However, the suborbital flights shall also comply with the ac-
ceptable level of risk to third parties, i.e. the general public (e.g.
passengers in an Airbus A320 and people on the ground). This
additional requirement is stricter due to the perceived level of
safety of the general public. The people at risk should therefore
be grouped as follows:
• SSV and spaceplane occupants:
– Passengers
– Crew
• Third Parties:
– Fellow airspace users
– General public on the ground.
1.2.3. Severity of Risk
S&R work extends across the full-scale of severity, from a loss
of life to no immediate S&R effect and everything in-between. In
this context, S&R can and should be utilised to (i) demonstrate
an ALoS so that flights can take place and (ii) systems have been
optimised. RCSs are discussed further in Sects. 1.4.3 and 2.3.
They incorporate the following severity aspects:
• Catastrophic (e.g. loss of life, loss of space vehicle)
• Hazardous (e.g. loss of significant system, emergency proce-
dure invoked)
• Major (e.g. partial loss of significant system, abnormal pro-
cedure invoked)
• Minor (e.g. degraded system performance, increased work-
load)
• Insignificant (e.g. no immediate effect on safety).
1.2.4. Contributors
When considering risks related to STM, it is important to under-
stand where they fit in the complete safety picture. Figure 1 sum-
marises all the different groups of contributors and highlights the
STM part as the boundary of the S&R work for this concept (see
orange boxes).
1.2.5. Timing of Risk Management Activities
Risk management activities can be conducted during different
time frames, depending on two general risk categories. The first
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Figure 2: Example flight routes shown for a European STM
(ESTM) with different numbers of interfaces. Among them, the
turquoise-coloured scenario is the most complex one, requiring
multiple handovers between different ATM and STM blocks.
one is related to steady-state risks which are assessed and man-
aged as part of a certification process for equipment types and
operators (which is the typical approach in aviation) while the
second one is related to mission-specific risks. These risks are
assessed and managed prior to each flight in order to achieve the
“GO” decision (typical approach for space missions, e.g., when
waiting for Space Weather or space debris clearance). As the
STM develops and matures, it is anticipated that mission-specific
risk activities will migrate to the steady-state phase. However,
this can only occur if supported by S&R activities demonstrat-
ing that an ALoS is maintained.
1.3. Interfaces
Regarding S&R, interfaces are generally a weak-point in any
system. The SES initiative (see the ATM Master Plan 2015) is
one example to highlight this importance and which STM can
learn from. Interfaces whether internal to the STM or external
(see Figure 2) should be identified and minimised.
1.4. Candidate S&R Knowledge-Transfer from Aviation
The current development status of the commercial suborbital
space travel industry can be compared to the very early days
of aviation. However, one fundamental difference is that we now
have lots of experience and proven, good-practices in the art of
flying and ATM. Therefore, particularly from a S&R aspect, the
commercial space industry as a whole must take advantage of
the lessons learned over the decades of aviation and read-across
today’s best practices. The areas related to S&R in the context of
traffic management, a potential STM system could benefit from,
have been summarised in the following sub-sections.
1.4.1. Safety Management Systems in Aviation
Safety Management Systems (SMS) are a regulatory require-
ment for certified aviation operations, like airlines and Air Nav-
igation Service Provider (ANSPs). They were introduced to ad-
dress the concern that a system is designed to an acceptable level
of performance at the start of operations, however, if unchecked,
the performance level will gradually reduce and potentially, in
the worst-case, lead to an accident. ICAO have published a dedi-
cated annex to the Convention on International Civil Aviation for
Safety Management (ICAO 2013a), in which it defines a SMS as:
"A systematic approach to managing safety, including the neces-
sary organisational structures, accountabilities, policies and pro-
Operational Safety
Assessment
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Start operations
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Technical Approval
Process
No 
(redesign)
Yes
Operational assumptions & issues
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(risk redesign)
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Figure 3: Overview of the safety process for aviation operations.
cedures". A Safety Management Manual (ICAO 2013b) has also
been produced by ICAO which provides in-depth guidance to the
implementation and oversight of safety management.
The framework of a generic SMS is also covering safety
policy and objectives (including management commitment and
responsibility and safety accountabilities), safety risk manage-
ment, safety assurance (including safety performance monitor-
ing, change management and continuous improvement of the
SMS) and safety promotion (i.e. training and communication).
1.4.2. S&R Assessment Process in Aviation
In Figure 3 the framework of the safety process between equip-
ment (technical) and operational aspects of an aviation func-
tional system is outlined. At this high level, it is possible to apply
the process to a STM functional system (see also Sect. 2.8). It is
also recommended to integrate as far as possible the S&R effort
on the equipment side and the operational side. This is especially
relevant if the equipment is being developed concurrently with
the operation and in which case iteration loops between the S&R
assessments would also make sense.
A key aspect of the S&R assessment is the demonstration
that the SW and complex electronic HW have been developed
to a sufficient level of robustness. In aviation, there are devel-
opment standards that are acceptable means of compliance for
certification requirements. These include DO-178C (RTCA &
EUROCAE 2011a) and DO-254 (RTCA & EUROCAE 2000)
for airborne software and electronic hardware, respectively, plus
ED-153 (EUROCAE 2009) and DO-278A (RTCA & EURO-
CAE 2011b) for ANS and CNS/ATM software, respectively
1.4.3. Aviation Safety Risk Classification Schemes
A Risk Classification Scheme forms a fundamental part of any
risk management process, and STM and ATM is no exception.
Although the details may vary, the basic steps taken to define
the required mitigation actions are the same (see Figure4). For
ATM a RCS has been produced by Eurocontrol in one of their
safety regulatory requirements, ESARR 4 (Eurocontrol 2011),
supported by substantial guidance, including a review of other
aviation schemes (Eurocontrol 2000). As shown in the next sec-
tion, the safety RCS also plays a fundamental part in the clas-
sification of occurrences during the service life of a functional
system.
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1. Assess Probability of Safety Risk 
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Figure 4: Generic steps in classifying a risk.
1.4.4. Occurrence Reporting in Aviation
In aviation, regulations exist that specify what occurrence de-
tails must be reported to the national supervisory authorities (EU
No. 376/2014 and 2015/1018). Collecting data regarding occur-
rences can play a significant role in improving the S&R of the
STM as a whole. This includes all levels of severity because an
occurrence could be classified as minor or insignificant on its
own, however, as part of a large group of other minor occur-
rences, it could be a concern – known as an “emerging” property
of the system.
If analysed intelligently, occurrence data can allow actions
to be taken to mitigate risks before they lead to an accident.
However, this is reliant on having sound inputs (i.e. the oc-
currence details) which are complete and consistent irrespec-
tive from which organisation in which country the data origi-
nates from. It is also reliant on efficient methods of reporting
and communicating and data handling and processing. To help
with this in aviation, Eurocontrol has developed a tool called
TOKAI (Toolkit for ATM Occurrence Investigation, Eurocon-
trol 2016a)), which includes a Risk Analysis Tool so a common
classification is achieved (Eurocontrol 2015), as well as a pro-
cess requirement document, ESARR 2 (Eurocontrol 2009).
1.4.5. Top Safety Risks in Aviation
In civil aerospace, accidents can be broken down into the follow-
ing basic types:
• Collision between moving aircraft (flight or ground)
• Collision between aircraft and ground
• Impact with other avoidable airborne objects (e.g. missiles,
drones, birds)
• Impact with other avoidable ground objects (i.e. physical
structures)
• Loss of control from avoidable external influence, e.g.:
– Extreme weather (wind shear, turbulence storms, light-
ning, etc.)
– Wake vortex (jet wash, wingtip vortices).
Several aviation organisations have published what they see
as the top priorities in safety, which are noteworthy insofar as
they can be considered as a checklist to ensure they are taken
into account in the S&R assessment of the STM concepts. This
should be two-fold: (i) read-across risk to STM and, (ii) pre-
venting unacceptable impacts on these sensitive areas in aviation
from spaceplane traffic in shared airspace. For example, Euro-
control’s top five ATM operational safety priorities (Eurocontrol
2016b), based on a review of the two high-risk categories ’run-
way incursions’ and ’loss of separation en-route’, are as follows:
• Operations without/with failed transponder
• Landing without clearance
• Detectability of occupied runway
• Detectability of loss of separation (blind spot)
• Loss of separation across adjacent sectors.
1.4.6. Top Level S&R Requirements in Aviation
Aircraft system certification probability requirements for unde-
sirable events which are linked to their severity, based on an ac-
cepted probability of 1 catastrophic accident every one million
flying hours (1 × 10−6 flight hour−1) due to any and all poten-
tial contributors (EASA 2014). With each step down to a lower
severity classification, the accepted probability is increased by
two orders of magnitude. This is essentially applying to the peo-
ple on the aircraft. It also protects against the people on the
ground inasmuch as a large object falling off an aircraft or the air-
craft itself crashing onto the ground is classified as catastrophic.
Therefore, it has to be demonstrated by design that this is so un-
likely, it is not expected to occur.
Eurocontrol has derived a maximum tolerable probability for
an catastrophic accident of 1.55×10−8 flight hour−1, due to ATM
contributors (Eurocontrol 2011). However, this refers to an over-
all safety performance of ATM at national level and still needs
to be decomposed into the constituent parts of the ATM system
(and, if necessary, per phase of flight and/or per accident type)
before it can be applied to the classification of individual hazards
or consequences. Quantitative requirements for the lower sever-
ity classifications have not yet been specified, due to insufficient
data regarding the current level of ATM performance.
From the point of view of the STM concept, these figures
are linked with the third party risk (see Sect. 2.4.2). They also
indicate the difficulty in setting quantitative requirements.
1.5. Existing Organisations and STM-related Roles
Space-related activities in the fields of S&R are being carried out
by a number of organisations. The following is a selected sum-
mary from Europe and the USA, including their current role in
relation to the development of a STM system. It is by no means
a comprehensive list and is intended to serve as an indication of
the multiple efforts currently ongoing.
• ESA (European Space Agency)
– Product Assurance and Flight Safety are part of ESA’s
main activities
– Strategy and harmonisation of space development activi-
ties is led by ESA
◦ E.g., European Technology Harmonisation Process
– Standardisation (see ECSS entry below)
– Numerous technical papers
◦ E.g. assessment of break-up severity on operational
satellites (Letizia et al. 2016)
• ECSS (European Cooperation for Space Standardization)
– The ECSS, steered by ESA and supported by national
space agencies, have produced a suite of standards in four
branches:
◦ Project management – including risk management
◦ Product assurance – including safety
◦ Engineering – including ground systems and opera-
tions
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◦ Sustainability – including space debris and SSA
• FAA/AST (FAA/Office of Commercial Space Transporta-
tion)
– Regulates US commercial space transportation
– Issues FAA licenses for commercial launches of orbital
and sub-orbital rockets
◦ Including safety approval (see FAA-AST 2012)
– Issues licenses for commercial spaceports
– Produces and commissions reports and studies, including
for example:
◦ Flight Safety Analysis Handbook (FAA-AST 2011)
◦ Re-entry Hazard Analysis Handbook (Tooley et al.
2005)
◦ Space Vehicle Operations Debris Threat Mitigation
Study (Johnson et al. 2016)
◦ Space Transportation ConOps Annex for NextGen
(see FAA-AST 2008)
– Includes the COMSTAC (Commercial Space Transporta-
tion Advisory Committee)
◦ Provides information, advice and recommendations
to FAA via working groups, e.g. international space
policy, legal, operations, standards
◦ Members from industry, government, academia and
associations
– Chapter 13 of FAA’s System Safety Handbook “The Ap-
plication of System Safety to the Commercial Launch
Industry” (FAA 2000), includes an outline of the licens-
ing, the system safety engineering and software assur-
ance processes
• NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration)
– Research and development agency of the US government
– NASA’s main aims include the development of commer-
cial spaceflight capabilities and research in aeronautics
– Includes the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
◦ Evaluates NASA safety performance and provides
improvement advice
– Created the Columbia Accident Investigation Board
◦ Instigated a lot of work regarding risk to airspace
users and public on the ground from re-entry events
• IAASS (International Association for the Advancement of
Space Safety)
– A non-profit organisation dedicated to furthering interna-
tional cooperation and scientific advancement in the field
of space systems safety
– Incorporated several technical committees, broken down
as follows:
◦ Launch and Re-entry Safety
◦ Space Hazards
◦ Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety
◦ Human Factors & Performance for Safety
◦ Space Safety Laws & Regulations
– Conferences are held about every 18 months, proceed-
ings (e.g., Sgobba & Rongier 2014) include topics like:
◦ Small debris fragment contribution to collision
probability for spacecraft in LEO
◦ Demonstrator for Space-Based Space Surveillance
◦ Operational Feedback regarding Collision Risk
Avoidance at Launch in Europe
◦ Lessons learned in Aviation Safety
– Other topics include Public Risk Criteria and Rationale
for Commercial Launch and Re-entry (Wilde 2011)
– Standards and guidelines are also produced, for example:
◦ Space Safety Standard – Commercial Human-Rated
System (IAASS ISSB 2010)
◦ Safety Design and Operation of Suborbital Vehicles
Guidelines (IAASS 2010), including a section on
the integration of suborbital space flights into ATM
and a list of accident types and significant events
based on a similar list from ICAO
– IAASS is also leading the development of a tool called
ADMIRE (Aviation – Debris & Meteorites Integrated
Risk Evaluation) to assess risks to aviation due to re-
entering space debris and meteorites (Emanuelli 2014)
• ASTM International
– American-based organisation that enables industry,
academia, regulators, etc. around the globe to come to-
gether and produce standards and recommended prac-
tices
– At the time of writing, a new committee is being formed
to develop and maintain voluntary consensus standards
and recommended practices for the commercial space-
flight industry. The scope includes design, manufactur-
ing and operational use of vehicles used for human and
unmanned spaceflight.
• RCC (Range Commanders Council)
– Provides technical and operational support to U.S. test,
training and operational ranges. Members are different
branches of the US military and NASA.
– The scope of their work and standards/guidelines pro-
duced includes the management of risk related to rocket
launches.
2. Recommended S&R Objectives for the STM
This section summarises the proposed objectives related to S&R
in order to support certifiable STM operations. Although mainly
a qualitative approach, quantitative proposals have been made
wherever they can be substantiated with a valid rationale and/or
assumption. The different categories covered have been broken
down as follows:
1) Regulations and Standards
2) Overall S&R Approach
3) Safety Risk Classification Scheme
4) Acceptable Level of Safety
5) Critical Qualitative S&R Requirements
6) Addressing the Key Hazards.
7) Occurrence Reporting.
2.1. Regulations and Standards
The following aspects originate from the S&R considerations
due to the close link with certification and standards. However,
they can be applied to the complete regulatory and standards
landscape. Regulation should be technology-neutral and enable
industry to generate technical solutions and propose any neces-
sary standards. Requirements and standards should be applicable
to all space operations in Europe, i.e. not just to products from
European manufacturers.
A European organisation should be selected to lead the Eu-
ropean effort to select and update existing standards and/or de-
velop new ones, including Minimum Operational Performance
Standards (MOPS). This work should be in coordination with a
European Standards Organisation (CENELEC, CEN, ETSI), to
aid incorporation within legislation and with other industry stan-
dard bodies outside of Europe, to ensure a harmonised approach.
The ECSS could be a good option for this, supported by experts
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and organisations with experience in ATM standards. Compat-
ibility and harmonisation with standards applicable to aviation
should be ensured where necessary and where beneficial. This
work should also include the selection and publication of a sin-
gle set of terms and definitions.
ESA should establish and chair a forum to enable regula-
tory activities to be progressed. This forum should include rep-
resentatives from the relevant parties, such as national space
agencies, national aviation authorities, ECSS, EASA and Eu-
rocontrol, as well as representatives and/or input from industry
experts, such as potential Space Navigation Service Providers
(SNSPs), ANSPs, ground equipment and vehicle manufacturers,
airport and airline operators. A communication and data-sharing
link with similar forums outside of Europe should also be es-
tablished to support the global harmonisation. Similarly, a har-
monisation programme should be established with the European
aviation equivalent forum.
Finally, because we are at the beginning of this development,
a great opportunity currently exists for developing the regulatory
framework for the holistic system (STM, SSV/spaceplane and
spaceport systems). This is particularly attractive for S&R activ-
ities and maximising their benefit for the industry as a whole.
With the inclusion of all potential contributors to causing and
preventing an accident within the regulatory and standards scope
(cf Sect. 1.2.4), the optimum and most efficient solution for the
future space transportation industry can be realised. As Sect. 1.5
indicates, there is already no shortage of good information avail-
able, indeed consolidation and harmonisation are seen as key
steps to be taken regarding regulation and standardisation.
2.2. Overall S&R Approach
2.2.1. S&R Enabling STM Development
From an early stage, the benefits of smart S&R assessments
should be promoted. A potential conflict of interest can often
be perceived between S&R and efficiency of a functional sys-
tem. However, besides demonstrating compliance with require-
ments and minimising risks, joint safety and reliability activities
can also benefit the efficiency of a service operation. If started
at the right time and conducted intelligently, S&R work can be
exploited to justify the presence of all the elements of the func-
tional system, in other words to show that the system is not over-
complex.
In order to support a successful development of the STM and
the industry in general, S&R needs to be able to demonstrate that
an ALoS is achieved, no matter what the traffic management con-
cept and technology capability. Regarding SSV and spaceplane
traffic for example, a move from today’s segregation approach
of space vehicle and aircraft towards more and more integration
(see also Figure 18 in Paper I (Tüllmann et al. 2017a)), until
airspace is only closed to other traffic in the event of a space
vehicle failure, requires more than technological and operational
innovations. It also requires those innovations to have a predicted
reliability that enables an ALoS to be demonstrated.
It is assumed that commercial space transportation could be-
come similar to today’s air transportation with many flights on
a daily basis and considered “normal” by a large portion of the
general public. During the development of the STM system, each
concept of operations produced should be supported by S&R ac-
tivities, including a generic safety case and supporting assess-
ments. The S&R techniques should be exploited to assess any
options that may arise and aid the decision-making process. This
would also include to consider the number and complexity of
needed interfaces.
2.2.2. Multi-Directional Approaches
In order to support the STM development, top-level S&R re-
quirements (quantitative and qualitative) need to be defined and
accepted (e.g. risk classification, maximum probabilities of oc-
currence, processes). This is the start of the “top-down” ap-
proach. Once the top level requirements have been defined, it
will be further required to decompose the requirements for dif-
ferent functional systems and parts within. Then, as part of the
development of a functional system including its operations,
S&R assessments will be conducted with the overall aim of
demonstrating that compliance with the relevant requirements
has been achieved. This is the “bottom-up” approach.
The S&R assessments of a functional system should also be
split into two broad categories, both of which should contribute
to the overall safety case of a functional system:
• Predict the combination of failures/event that could lead to
each risk scenario:
– To be used in the S&R assessment of equipment
– Recognising that it is impossible to confidently predict
all combinations in today’s complex systems
– Lends itself well to the quantitative assessment of ran-
dom failures
– To be supported by assurance processes which help
demonstrate qualitatively that certain aspects of the sys-
tem (e.g. software) are as robust as practical
• Implement independent lines of defence against the risk sce-
narios:
– To be used in the S&R assessment of operations
– Lends itself well to a qualitative assessment of the ro-
bustness of the complete functional system.
A third S&R area where the activities are broken down into
two general classes is related to the timing of the assess-
ments between (i) steady-state and (ii) mission-specific risks (cf.
Sect. 1.2.5). Which S&R activities should be carried out when,
needs to be agreed and published as part of the overall S&R
guidelines for STM activities. It should be periodically reviewed
in order to not only maintain its validity, but also to ensure it
reflects the most efficient approach.
2.2.3. Safety Management System
Further to Sect. 1.4.1, the requirement for a SMS should be part
of the regulations for STM service providers, supported by suit-
able guidance on acceptable means of compliance. Ideally, this
would re-use current publications (perhaps with an update, if
necessary). To this end, the existing ICAO documentation re-
lated to SMS (Annex 19, see ICAO 2013a) and the Safety Man-
agement Manual (ICAO 2013b)) should be reviewed together
with the ECSS safety standard (ECSS 2009a) for suitability to
STM service providers and supervisory authorities. In addition,
the principal ATM EU regulations are in the process of a sig-
nificant update (EU 2016) and this, together with the associated
guidance material from EASA should also be part of the study.
2.2.4. S&R Techniques
There are many well-proven and accepted S&R techniques used
today in all safety-critical domains, for example: Goal Structur-
ing Notation, Fault Tree Analysis, Failure Modes, Effects and
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Table 1: Safety Risk Probability Index
SRP
class
Title Quantitative
Definition
Description
A Frequent TBD – see
Sects. 1.4.6
and 2.4
Extremely likely to occur
(and/or has occurred fre-
quently)
B Probable Expected to occur several
times (and/or has occurred
infrequently)
C Remote May occur, but not often
(and/or has occurred very
infrequently)
D Extremely
Remote
Unlikely to occur, but still
could at some time (and/or
not known to have oc-
curred)
E Extremely
Improbable
Not expected to occur.
May only occur in ex-
ceptional cases (and not
known to have occurred)
Criticality Analysis, Common Cause Analysis, Human Error As-
sessment & Reduction Technique and Process Failure Modes
and Effects Analysis. There are also many sources of guidance
and explanations about the techniques available, for instance, in
space and aviation:
• ECSS Space product assurance safety standard (ECSS
2009a), which includes references to more detailed guidance
to for example, FTA, CCA, FMECA, Human Error
• Eurocontrol’s Safety Assessment Methodology framework
and toolbox
– Including for example, a Safety Case Development Man-
ual (Eurocontrol 2006)
• UK CAA Guidance on Safety Assessments (UK CAA 2010)
• FAA/Eurocontrol ATM Safety Techniques and Toolbox
(FAA & Eurocontrol 2007)
• Eurocontrol Experimental Centre review of common tech-
niques (Eurocontrol 2004)
• SAE guidelines & methods for civil aviation (SAE 1996).
As part of the guidance material for system developers in the
STM system, recommended S&R techniques should be in-
cluded. Ideally, this would reference to existing publications
which could be used in the generic safety case (see Sect. 2.2.1).
2.3. Safety Risk Classification Scheme
A common Safety Risk Classification Scheme should be agreed
and published, together with supporting guidance on its use. This
scheme should then be used by service providers for (a) classify-
ing risks, (b) determining probability objectives for their hazards
(see last paragraph in this section) and (c) assigning a severity to
occurrences (see also Sect. 2.7). A common scheme is impor-
tant for consistency throughout the different service providers. It
should also be harmonised as far as practical with other schemes
used in (i) STM outside of Europe, (ii) SSV and spaceplane cer-
tification, (iii) ATM and (iv) Operations of spaceports & airports.
Existing schemes used by organisations to demonstrate com-
pliance with the ECSS Risk Management standard (ECSS 2008)
and Eurocontrol’s safety regulatory requirements, ESARR 4
(Eurocontrol 2011) should be used as the main references. A
proposed scheme is contained in the following subsections and
Table 2: Safety Risk Severity Index
SRS
class
Title Description of Potential Effect
1 Catastrophic Loss of life or loss of a service user’s prod-
uct/object (e.g. spaceplane, aircraft). Ex-
treme widespread environmental damage.
2 Hazardous Complete loss of a significant system or
results in the application of an emergency
procedure (to prevent it from being a catas-
trophic risk) and/or a large reduction in
safety margins. Severe environmental dam-
age.
3 Major Partial loss of a significant system or re-
sults in the application of an abnormal pro-
cedure (to prevent it from propagating to a
hazardous risk) and/or a significant reduc-
tion in safety margins. Major environmental
damage.
4 Minor Degraded or affected normal operational
procedures or performance, increased
workload for operators (to prevent it from
propagating to a major risk) and/or a
slight reduction in safety margins. Minor
environmental damage.
5 Insignificant No safety effect.
No environmental damage
should be used as a starting point for discussions and develop-
ment into a final scheme for publication.
The probability requirements for the undesirable events and
hazard consequences identified in the S&R assessments can be
determined from the Safety RCS based on their severity classi-
fication. If the severity of a hazard consequence is classified as
“Catastrophic”, the maximum probability requirement would be
“Extremely Improbable”. The same requirement for the hazard
itself can then also be determined by taking account of the like-
lihood that the hazard leads to the consequence. The quantitative
element of requirement will depend, at least initially, on the peo-
ple at risk (cf. Sect. 1.2.2), however the remainder of the RCS
should be suitable for all. In the following section we propose a
RCS for STM purposes, reflecting the aforementioned consider-
ations and requirements.
2.3.1. Safety Risk Probability
The Safety Risk Probability (SRP) is the likelihood of the haz-
ard/risk consequences actually occurring. A proposed SRP index
is presented in Table 1.
2.3.2. Safety Risk Severity
The Safety Risk Severity (SRS) considers the extent of harm to
the functional system that might reasonably occur as a result of
the hazard consequence (see also Sect. 1.2.3). In Table 2 the pro-
posed SRS index is shown.
2.3.3. Safety Risk Level
The Safety Risk Level (SRL) is determined from a combination
of Tables 1 and 2 regarding probability and severity. In the event
that a hazard could lead to multiple potential scenarios with dif-
ferent combinations of SRP and SRS, the worst-case credible
SRL should be allocated. An example SRL matrix is presented
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Table 3: Example Aviation Safety Risk Level Index
Safety Risk Severity (SRS)
Safety Risk 5 4 3 2 1
Probability (SRP) Insignificant Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic
A Low High High High High
Frequent (5A) (4A) (3A) (2A) (1A)
B Low Medium High High High
Probable (5B) (4B) (3B) (2B) (1B)
C Low Low Medium High High
Remote (5C) (4C) (3C) (2C) (1C)
D Low Low Low Medium High
Extremely Remote (5D) (4D) (3D) (2D) (1D)
E Low Low Low Low Medium
Extremely Improbable (5E) (4E) (3E) (2E) (1E)
Table 4: Safety Risk Tolerability Index
SRL SRT Type of Action Required
High Intolerable WARNING
Ensure that risk assessment has been
satisfactorily completed and declared
mitigation means are in place to prevent
propagation to identified hazard.
If necessary, do not permit further op-
eration until sufficient control measures
have been implemented. As a mini-
mum, SRL must be reduced to Medium.
Medium Tolerable CAUTION
Perform risk mitigation as necessary
based on an ALARP principle.
Regularly review & monitor risk.
Low Acceptable REVIEW
Risk mitigation is optional, based on an
ALARP principle.
Regularly review risk.
in Table 3. At least at the beginning more than one SRL ma-
trix will be needed, because of the different risk levels for the
different parties at risk (see Sect. 2.4), e.g. SRL 1D might be
medium and therefore tolerable for spaceplane occupants, but
not for third parties.
2.3.4. Safety Risk Tolerability
The Safety Risk Tolerability (SRT) is defined from the SRL and
defines the action to be taken. Table 4 shows the proposed SRT
index.
2.3.5. Initial SRL Indices for Space Weather
As an example of use of the previously introduced Risk Clas-
sification Scheme, we continue to classify the risks associated
with unawareness of Space Weather events for Space Traffic op-
erations as defined in the risk register of Paper I (see Table 4 in
Tüllmann et al. 2017a). The results are provided in Table 5 and
are based on the frequency of Space Weather events causing haz-
ards and negative impacts on critical infrastructure or services
for Space Traffic Control and Operations.
The meaning of the columns and parameters shown in Ta-
ble 5 is as follows. Columns 1 – 3 list the Risk-ID, Risk title and
provide a high-level description of the risks. In column 4, risk
classifications are given that characterise the risks in terms of
main impact on travel schedule (SC), performance (P), safety (S)
and costs (C). The Safety Risk Severity (SRS) given in column
5, the Safety Risk Probability (SRP) in column 6 and the Safety
Risk Level (SRL) in column 7 are derived from the Safety RCS
discussed throughout Sects. 2.3.1 – 2.3.3. In the case a hazard
leads to multiple potential scenarios with different combinations
of SRPs and SRSs, the worst-case credible SRL is allocated.
In this scheme values highlighted in red represent unacceptable
risks for Space Traffic operations on customer and crew level
(zone of avoidance) and require immediate mitigation measures.
2.4. Acceptable Level of Safety
Following on from the note in Sect. 2.3 and as part of the
“top-down” approach, the following sub-sections propose a way-
forward in order to determine the top-level S&R requirements
that must be agreed and published. In line with the scope defi-
nition in Sect. 1.2.2 for the parties at risk, it is broken down to
SSV/spaceplane occupants and third parties.
2.4.1. ALoS – SSV and Spaceplane Occupants
As stated in Sect. 1.2.2, a key assumption here is that the early
SSV and spaceplane passengers are not considered to be gen-
eral public in the same way today’s air travellers are. In other
words, a higher level of risk will be acceptable to them, which
will support the development of the industry. The IAASS guide-
lines (IAASS 2010) have suggested a quantitative requirement
for a catastrophic event as 1 × 10−4 flight−1, assuming a subor-
bital mission is 1 hour flight in total. Due to the obvious lack
of historical data and evidence, this has been derived from the
ESA standard crew safety risk (ESA 2012) which states, that the
probability of a catastrophic event during the entire mission shall
not exceed 1 × 10−4 and pragmatically setting it in the middle of
orbital spaceflight (shuttle) and civil aviation (see Sect. 1.4.6).
However, this is again a budget for all potential contributors, as
identified in Sect. 1.2.4. Therefore, a further study is required to
decompose the requirement amongst the contributors.
The S&R assessment should also consider if the undesirable
events, under consideration for their impact on SSV and space-
plane occupants, can also pose a risk to third parties. If so, it
could mean a more stringent requirement must be applied. For
example, if a catastrophic in-flight spaceplane break-up could
collide with an aircraft, it would also have to meet the third party
requirement (see also Sect. 2.6.4).
8 of 13
R. Tüllmann et al.: On the Implementation of a European Space Traffic Management System
Table 5: Risk quantifications associated with unawareness of Space Weather events
Risk-ID Risk Title Description Classification SRS SRP SRL
R-STM-1 Power Outages STM operation can be affected in case of power outages
due to severe space storms
SC,P,C,S 2 D 2D
R-STM-2∗) Imprecise and safety-
critical navigation
Due to spatial gradients and temporal variability of the
plasma density in the ionosphere
SC,S,P,C 3 B 3B
R-STM-3 Augmentation systems Performance degradation of space-based and ground
based augmentation systems due to ionospheric gradi-
ents
SC,P,C,S 3 B 3B
R-STM-4 Radiation damage Exposition of crew and passengers to harmful radiation
(GCR and SCR)
P,C,S 3 B 3B
R-STM-5 Disruption of Communi-
cation
HF communications are used in remote regions (ocean,
poles)
P,C,S 4 B 4B
R-STM-6 Damage of space infras-
tructure by radiation belt
particles or SEPs
SEPs are highly variable and dangerous during high-
intensity, large-fluence events and can affect space ve-
hicles
P,C,S 3 B 3B
Notes. ∗)Imprecise and safety-critical navigation is not just a risk factor during take-off and landing. In case of space operations, suborbital p2p
flights take place at altitudes between 100 km and 500 km, which is in the middle of the ionosphere. Therefore, simple 2D TEC models cannot be
used to derive the correct range error information at these heights, as information on ionospheric thickness above and below the space vehicle is
needed. In case of aviation performed at altitudes around 10 km, precise positioning during the flight might not be that important, because there is
usually a sufficiently-sized safety margin between different airplanes. This is different for space operations carried out at 300 km altitudes, where
precise positioning becomes very important due to the high risk of space debris impacts. Hence, not only the position of the space debris has to
be known precisely, but also the exact position of the moving space vehicle. In order to mitigate GNSS inaccuracies induced by the ionosphere at
these altitudes, the development of near real-time, data-driven and model-assisted 3D TEC reconstruction is required (see Table 4 in Paper I).
2.4.2. ALoS - Third Parties
The current accepted risk levels from aviation should be used as
a basis for defining an ALoS to third parties in the air and on
the ground. As a minimum requirement, spaceplanes and SSVs
should not pose a greater risk to third parties in the air or on
the ground than current aviation (see Sect. 1.4.6). Note, how-
ever, that there are differences between conventional aviation and
space transportation which justify a lower target (Wilde 2011):
• How people respond to accidents
• Much longer return to service for space transportation in
event of a third party casualty
• Aviation accidents cause less concern / outrage
• Very different accident rates
• Space transportation risk and complexity is inherently higher
than in aviation
• Very different levels of maturity
Based on the above, the FAA has recently issued a final rule
on an update to its risk limits for third parties (FAA 2016). The
relevant regulatory requirements from the FAA include a de-
tailed breakdown of probability requirements that must be met
for launch and re-entry. For example, CFR Part 417 Launch
Safety (§ 417.107 Flight Safety) includes the following require-
ments:
• Total risk to public (excluding ships and aircraft) shall not
exceed 1 × 10−4 casualties
• Risk to an individual member of the public shall not exceed
1 × 10−6 per launch per hazard
• Risk of water-borne third-party casualty due to debris impact
shall not exceed 1 × 10−5
• Risk of an airborne third-party casualty due to debris impact
shall not exceed 1 × 10−6.
The process and rationale behind these regulations and re-
quirements should be reviewed for applicability in Europe and
read-across accordingly, bearing in mind the anticipated regu-
lar suborbital flights. As far as STM itself is concerned, these
targets would also need to be broken down and shared accord-
ingly with the potential contributors. These figures should also
be considered in the context of re-entering objects in general (see
Sect. 2.6.3).
2.5. Critical Qualitative S&R Requirements
In addition to the ALoS discussed in the previous sections, the
following S&R qualitative requirements should be applied to the
undesirable events classified with the severity stated:
• Any consequence classified as catastrophic shall not be
caused by:
– Any single failure
– Any single failure combined with a dormant condition
– Software errors alone
– Operator errors alone
• Consequences classified as hazardous shall not be caused by:
– Any single electronic failure
– Any single electronic failure combined with a dormant
condition
– Software errors alone.
2.6. Addressing the Key Hazards
This section summarises the proposals for addressing the follow-
ing key hazards in support of the development of a successful
STM system:
1) Space Weather
2) Space debris/objects
3) Re-entering objects
4) Shared airspace.
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2.6.1. Space Weather
As explained in Sect. 2.3.5 and to further detail in Sect. 3.6 of
Paper I (Tüllmann et al. 2017a), Space Weather poses a risk to
the STM systems and to human health. For designing a S&R
concept for STM, the following general points which are relevant
to Space Weather should be considered.
In support of the development of a Space Weather moni-
toring system, S&R requirements for the SWMC should be (i)
defined and validated and (ii) verified. For example, reliability
requirements for the detection and reporting of Space Weather
events, shall be commensurate with the severity of the potential
effects of a failure.
Furthermore, to be in a position to validate the S&R require-
ments for the Space Weather monitoring system, they should be
developed and validated in conjunction with those on the areas
listed below. Besides validation, this will also help to find the
optimum solution for:
• Spaceplane and SSV radiation shielding (humans and elec-
tronics)
• STM equipment that can be impacted by Space Weather
• The Space Surveillance and Tracking system (because of the
risk of positional inaccuracies in the ionosphere combined
with the risk of collisions with space debris / objects)
• Structural protection of the spacecraft against collisions
• Applying credible avoidance actions in the event of a fore-
seen collision.
Validation of the S&R requirements will be a key proof-point
for the industry development, because the types and frequencies
of the Space Weather events cannot be altered plus there will be
limitations on the available technology to lessen their impact. It
is important to not only determine the risk exposure so the crew
and passengers understand, but also to be able to demonstrate
that the risk to fellow airspace users and third party people on
the ground in the event of a spacecraft incident is acceptable.
2.6.1.1. Human Health Risk from Radiation
One risk from Space Weather that is hard to protect against
at suborbital altitudes (but is predictable to some extent), stems
from high energy particles and proton events, that can cause radi-
ation damage to crew and passengers aboard the spacecraft. The
effects of radiation exposure on human health can be broadly
split between two categories, stochastic (random, probability
of occurrence in a population is a function of dose, e.g. can-
cer, leukaemia, genetic changes) and non-stochastic (threshold
effects the severity of which increases with dose (at a certain
threshold, every individual will see these effects), e.g. radiation
"sickness" or nausea, skin reddening, sterility and cataracts).
Radiation levels have been measured, for example a report
commissioned by the US DoT “Space Weather Biological and
System Effects for Suborbital flights” (Turner et al. 2008) states
that the cosmic radiation at sea level is about 0.26 mSv yr−1,
doubling with each 2 km altitude above sea level. It goes on
to say that dose equivalent rates at typical cruising altitudes for
commercial flights (8 000 m – 12 000 m) vary from 3 – 7 µSv h−1.
Therefore, a five hour flight would result in a total of 25 µSv
or 0.025 mSv, which is an order of magnitude below the annual
exposure at sea level. The annual allowed dose-rate is 20 mSv.
Human health risk from radiation is also linked heavily with
the design and technology of the spaceplanes and SSVs them-
selves. However, the STM should consider the modelling and
monitoring of individuals’ radiation levels in order to support
the pre-flight planning and risk assessment, as well as measuring
in support of maintaining exposure data. Flight data comparison
with models will also allow for continuous model improvement.
Criteria suggested to be monitored include:
• Total exposure duration
• Timing relative to event onset and peak
• Geomagnetic conditions
• Flight profile
• Shielding provided by vehicle
• History of radiation exposure of involved person.
Owing to the expected short duration of flights and the even
shorter exposure at altitudes where atmospheric shielding is sig-
nificantly reduced, the exposure of crew and passengers is min-
imal, except under extreme circumstances. Under typical condi-
tions, the radiation exposure to crew and passengers on a sub-
orbital flight is less than that for a long duration airline flight.
Avoiding exposure to potentially harmful radiation associated
with solar or geophysical disturbances can be achieved by lo-
cating launch sites at middle latitudes, or lower, or by delaying
flights when there are indications that a solar event is in progress
or is imminent. For a high-latitude site, a possible launch com-
mit criterion could be based on event probability distributions.
Although the radiation risk for crew and passengers is minimal,
except as noted, crew and passengers should be monitored for
radiation exposure because of the potential for litigation and the
possibility, however remote, that the onset of an event such as an
unanticipated Solar proton storm could occur during flight. Pas-
sengers should also be briefed on the radiation risks in the spirit
of informed consent.
2.6.2. Space Debris and Space Objects
The risk from the hazard of objects in space covered in this sec-
tion is that of a collision with the spaceplane (hazard from object
re-entry is covered in the next section). The subject of space de-
bris and space objects is covered in detail in Sect. 3.4 of Paper I.
The related salient S&R aspects are captured in this section.
Objects in space are either traceable or non-traceable, with
the latter largely outnumbering the former. It is assumed that
non-traceable objects will remain in the majority for the fore-
seeable future. This means, that the S&R approach for evaluat-
ing the collision risks must be two-fold. Risk quantifications for
traceable objects need to be based on planned flight trajectories
and the spacecraft’s structural survivability. These risks require a
continual assessment throughout the mission, whereas risks for
the non-traceable object population need to be based on best sta-
tistical information available.
In order to minimise collision risks with traceable objects,
the trajectory of both the spaceplane and the objects should be
as accurate as practical. Also, since the density of objects varies
with both altitude and latitude, the route of each spaceplane mis-
sion must be selected based on known risks. Note, that this is
also a key input to any assessment on route efficiency when it
comes to the implementation of environmental and Clean Space
aspects.
To minimise the severity of an impact, the spaceplanes’s
structural survivability and design should be as robust as prac-
tical. In order to determine the hazard severity thresholds for
collisions between spaceplanes and space objects, further re-
search into the potential impact effects needs to be carried out.
Particular collision-based risk assessments in aviation (e.g. bird-
strike, engine/tyre debris impact) should be reviewed to take ad-
vantage of transferable experience, methodology and capabil-
ity. The findings from EASA’s “Drone Collision” Task Force
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Table 6: Shielding capability versus maximum cross section of
the spacecraft)
Shielding capability Maximum cross-section
(debris size in mm) (m2)
1 10
5 100
10 1 000
(EASA 2016) and their future work may also provide opportu-
nity for knowledge-transfer in both directions as the threat poten-
tial posed by drones also exists at and in the vicinity of space-
ports.
In Sects. 3.4.1 and 3.5 of Paper I, an example p2p flight tra-
jectory has been analysed to see how close the spaceplane would
come to traceable objects (approximate size range of 10 cm and
above) and a rough order of magnitude estimate on the collision
risk with non-traceable objects has been provided. Even if we
assume a shielding capability of around 1cm (which is deemed
technically very challenging) and that the U.S. will soon expand
their Space Surveillance and Tracking Network to detect objects
with diameters of >3 cm, there is still a significant gap between
the traceable object size and shielding capability. The collision
risk has been examined with respect to the spaceplane’s cross-
sectional area, inclination and latitude of the flight path and the
time spent at each attitude (since space object density varies with
latitude and orbital altitude). The probability for a non-traceable
object greater than 0.1 cm colliding with the space vessel has
been estimated to be in the order of 1×10−7 per flight per square
metre of SSV cross-sectional area. Similarly, for objects greater
than 0.5 cm and 1 cm, the order was estimated to be 1×10−8 and
1 × 10−9, respectively (see Table 1 in Paper I (Tüllmann et al.
2017a)).
If we assume an overall catastrophic (loss of life and/or
loss of spaceplane, cf. Table 2) ALoS of 1 × 10−4 per flight
and that there are 100 potentially catastrophic scenarios for the
spacecraft and/or its occupants which have an equal share of
the budgeted requirement, then the maximum probability per
flight of a catastrophic collision with space debris amounts to
1 × 10−4/100 = 1 × 10−6. In Table 6 the maximum cross-section
of a spaceplane is expressed in relation to its needed shielding
capability, i.e. to withstand collisions with space debris particle
sizes of 1 mm, 5 mm and 10 mm, respectively.
On this basis, suborbital flights with vessels having a cross
section of 100 m2 and 1 mm shielding capability would not be
permitted to launch and require further analysis and substantial
technology advancements. However, it is important to note, that
these figures are provided to give an indication of the feasibil-
ity only and that the numerous supporting assumptions must be
validated before any further conclusions can be drawn. In ad-
dition, the determination of the collision severity must consider
the complete mission (e.g. catastrophic effect may not be realised
until re-entry) and S&R requirements for more frequent/less se-
vere collisions with debris have to be assessed in order to deter-
mine the full set of requirements (including impacts on space-
craft and minimising the creation of more debris).
Furthermore, in order for the spaceplane/SSV industry to de-
velop and become more like aviation today with common use
by the general public, it is reasonable to assume that the ALoS
for a catastrophic collision would have to be reduced by about
three orders of magnitude to ∼1 × 10−9 flight hour−1 (like avia-
tion today). Finally, it is important to note the overriding princi-
ple, namely that mitigating against collisions with traceable ob-
jects (with known data) is better than mitigating against statisti-
cal modelling.
According to Sect. 3.5 in Paper I, the risk resulting from the
gap between current shielding capabilities (0.1cm) and the ex-
pected traceable object size in the foreseeable future (3cm) is
estimated to be in the range of 1 – 8×10−3 flight−1 in terms of
collision probability (depending on the assumed cross section of
the spacecraft). Therefore, further studies are required to focus
on closing the gap between shielding capability and traceable ob-
jects as far as practical and advance this risk analysis, as well as
propose a recommended practice for operators to manage these
risks. Such a study should, at least, take into account the follow-
ing aspects:
• Technology development on heat and collision shielding to
increase reliability of structural survivability of the vessel
while simultaneously minimising cost and weight impacts
• Cost, reliability and accuracy of tracking space objects and
space vehicles
• Speed of warnings from the Space Surveillance and Tracking
network
• Efficiency and environmental impact of spaceplane routes
• Spaceplane controllability, e.g. regarding in-flight detection,
collision avoidance performance and trajectory robustness
(i.e. the ability to stick to the planned trajectory as closely
as possible in normal operations and how it is affected by
failure events).
2.6.3. Re-entering Objects
Space objects re-entering the Earth’s atmosphere present a risk
to airspace users, people on the ground and spaceplane launches.
Currently, the risk has to be accepted and up to now, there has
been no confirmed report of a casualty as a result of an ob-
ject falling from space. There are many challenges regarding the
tracking of re-entry objects, including the accuracy of any pre-
dicted trajectories and how and when the object may break-up.
For example, it has been estimated that the probability of an air-
craft being hit during the 40 min it took the debris from the Space
Shuttle Columbia accident to fall to Earth was somewhere be-
tween 0.3 and 0.003 (Emanuelli 2014), i.e. considerably higher
than the acceptable risks for third parties stated in Sect. 2.4.2.
Another example is the re-entry of the ROSAT X-ray satellite,
for which DLR calculated a probability of 1 in 580 that debris
would fall on to German territory and 1 in 700 000 that someone
could be harmed (DLR 2011).
An increase in the number of re-entering objects, an increase
in the density of air traffic and an increase in the general public
population could all impact the level of risk. A key S&R assump-
tion is that, at some point in time, it will not be acceptable to ac-
cept the risk of a casualty from re-entering objects. This means
that the risk must be quantified for today, as well as predicted for
the future, to allow states and ATM organisations to know and
understand the probability that an object could hit an aircraft
in their airspace or a member of public. This will also support
decision-making regarding ESA’s Clean Space initiatives in the
E.Deorbit branch, which are considered to be a qualitative im-
provement in the risk due to the move from uncontrolled to con-
trolled re-entries. This can then support wider studies (including
available technology, financial and environmental impacts, etc.)
to investigate, for example, the required tracking accuracy and
mitigation actions to be taken. Such studies should obviously in-
volve the relevant representatives from both space and aviation
industries.
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The risk and mitigation options surrounding re-entering ob-
jects are the subject of many studies around the world. In addi-
tion to Sect. 3.4.1 of Paper I, for example, IAASS is developing
ADMIRE (Aviation Debris & Meteorites Integrated Risk Eval-
uation), a tool to evaluate risks to aviation from single events,
annually and in real-time (Emanuelli 2014) while the FAA has
recently published study results on mitigating the debris threat
(Johnson et al. 2016).
Currently, the overall risk from re-entering objects has not
been quantified with sufficient logic and substantiation. There-
fore, a study to produce a global map of the risk from re-entering
objects to aviation and the general public should review the cur-
rent findings and status of conducted and ongoing work.
2.6.4. Shared Airspace
The hazard of spaceplanes sharing airspace with other aircraft
poses a risk of collision between spacecraft (or parts of it) and
aircraft. Currently, this is mitigated by segregation. However it
is assumed that this will not always be acceptable due to the
economic and environmental impact, especially considering the
predicted growth in both space and aircraft traffic (see also Fig-
ure 18 in Paper I). Therefore, S&R investigative work is needed
to support this development and allow an equivalent level of
safety (ELoS) to be demonstrated for each degree of integration.
It should be assumed that a collision between spaceplane and
aircraft would result in an accident with both vehicles lost and
multiple fatalities from both. Even if a higher ALoS is agreed
for spaceplane/SSV occupants, the ALoS for the aircraft occu-
pants (as third parties) cannot be altered from what it is today
and therefore drives the top level S&R requirement. This ap-
proach would also satisfy ALoS requirements for third parties
on the ground.
Therefore, using the Safety RCS as proposed in Sect. 2.3,
a collision between a spaceplane and an aircraft is classified
as catastrophic (see Table 2). This means the safety objective
shall be extremely improbable (as defined in Table 1) in order to
achieve a tolerable level of risk (see Tables 3 and 4). With the
classification of catastrophic, the additional requirements stated
in Sect. 2.5 shall also apply. This would be in line with the ALoS
third party requirements proposed in Sect. 2.4.2 (referring back
also to Sect. 1.4.5). If this level of safety cannot be demonstrated,
then the degree of integration cannot be increased from the level
accepted at that time. Note that this must also take into account
contingencies in the event of spaceplane or SSV break-ups.
In support of achieving the above, the spacecraft must essen-
tially interface with ATM in the same way as aircraft, follow the
same rules of the air (e.g. ICAO Annex 2) and be equipped with
systems and technologies that achieve (at least) the same level
of performance within the ATM network as the aircraft. The Air
Traffic Control Operator (ATCO) must also be fully aware and
understand the minimum, guaranteed performance capabilities
of each type of spaceplane and SSV (see Chapter 3.7 in Paper I).
2.7. Occurrence Reporting
Due to the potential gains in system performance and S&R,
as summarised in Sect. 1.4.4, the requirement to report occur-
rences and what data must be provided should be determined
and included the relevant STM regulations (see, e.g., EU reg-
ulations 376/2014 and the associated implementing regulation
2015/1018).
Part 2: Assessment of 
Compliance
Initial Investigation
Part 3: Certification
Part 1: Application and 
Preparation
If eligible
No
Yes
Review SNSP 
Documentation
Conduct Audit & Report
Non-conformities / Actions
Continue?
Action Resolution
Management of 
Application
Eligibility Assessment
Preparation for 
Assessment
Issue Certificate
Refuse Certification
Changes within ANSP
No
Figure 5: ANSP Certification Process Outline.
In support of this, it is important to promote the value of
an open and just culture in organisations. Realising the potential
benefits of wide-ranging occurrence data will rely on the people
who are providing STM services delivering data that is accurate
and complete. As mentioned in Sect. 2.3, occurrences should be
classified in accordance with the agreed safety RCS. In this re-
spect, it is fundamental to have a common scheme that all or-
ganisations should use in order to ensure a consistent classifica-
tion. This will support data analysis at a European level, which
in turn supports the identification of (i) accident pre-cursors and
(ii) emerging S&R concerns, as well as validates the safety risk
assessments and quantitative requirements (see Sec 1.4.6). It
should also be investigated whether it is practical to set up a
shared database with organisations outside of Europe.
An electronic reporting tool that can be accessed by the rel-
evant organisations should be developed to facilitate the report-
ing, collection and storage of the numerous occurrences. This
will ensure the most efficient communication process between
organisations and authorities. An investigation on the applicabil-
ity of Eurocontrol’s TOKAI tool (Eurocontrol 2016a) should be
conducted.
2.8. Space Navigation Service Provider Certification
Organisations that provide a service within the STM system
should be certified as a Space Navigation Service Provider
(SNSP). The process for certifying a SNSP should be based on
today’s aviation approach for an Air Navigation Service Provider
(ANSP). Figure 5 outlines a proposal for the SNSP certification
process, based on Eurocontrol’s guidelines for National Super-
visory Authorities (NSAs) for ANSP (Eurocontrol 2012).
This would be one part of the approval process for all ac-
tors within the industry which ensures that all the following are
certified:
• Spaceports and spaceport operators
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• Spaceplane and SSV types and the design and manufacturing
organisations
• SNSP and the STM equipment.
Further to some general principles proposed on regulations
in Sect. 2.1, regulatory requirements should obviously be de-
fined, as a certification basis, to give the supervisory authority
something to audit the SNSP candidate against. For ANSPs, the
EU regulation 1035/2011 is currently the main basis. However,
this is planned to be replaced in the next two years by a new reg-
ulation, together with substantial guidance material (EU 2016).
This suite of certification requirements and guidance, to-
gether with the interoperability experience of ATM (e.g. EU reg-
ulation 552/2004) and its compliance means, should be reviewed
for reading across to STM. The advantages of commonality and
harmonisation between the certification of SNSP and ANSP are
two-fold, first to exploit the knowledge and experience of service
providers and supervisory authorities and second, to maximise
the potential for integrating spaceplane traffic into air traffic.
As part of this study is also dedicated to examine a poten-
tial SNSP certification process, the following space-related li-
censing should be considered. For example, the FAA process for
licensing commercial launches includes: pre-licensing consulta-
tion, policy review, payload review, safety evaluation, financial
responsibility determination, and an environmental review (FAA
2000).
The S&R assessment process (outlined in Sect. 1.4.2) should
be part of the certification process, including the software and
complex electronic hardware assurance. Therefore, as part of the
definition of the certification process, the acceptable means of
compliance for software and electronic hardware should be spec-
ified and based on existing publications where possible. In addi-
tion to the aviation guidance stated in Sect. 1.4.2, the ECSS stan-
dards and handbooks related to this topic should be considered
(e.g. requirements for the development and maintenance of soft-
ware in spacecraft, launchers, payloads, experiments and ground
equipment and facilities (ECSS 2009b)).
3. Technical Requirements
A set of initial high-level requirements has been drafted, cov-
ering technical and operational aspects and constraints an inte-
grated European STM system should reflect, such as Safety and
Reliability, Space Weather or Space Surveillance and Tracking.
In addition, a high-level breakdown of possible operational and
organisational interfaces in the global context is also presented.
All this information is summarised in Paper III (Tüllmann et
al. 2017c). It is explicitly stated that Paper III does not intend
to provide a complete set of detailed requirements. Instead the
proposed requirements and interfaces presented in that work are
meant to provide a first rough guidance and stimulate discussions
on how a European STM system could be realised.
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